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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DOE, Guardian ad Litem 
for JANE DOE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
ROBERTO V. ARGUELLES, STATE 
OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
ANTHONY W. MITCHELL, Executive 
Director of Utah State Depart-
ment of Social Services, UTAH 
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State Youth Development Center, 
RUSS VAN VLEET, Treatment 
Plan and Release 
Coordinator for Utah State 
touth Development Center, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19061 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
-------
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Plaintiff seeking 
damages against the State of Utah for injuries she sustained 
due to a criminal act by Roberto Arguelles. The Plaintiff 
alleged that the decision of Defendant Stromberg, the 
paroling authority, to release Mr. Arguelles from the 
custody of the Youth Development Center, was improper. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Judge Philip R. Fishler, 
presiding, granted the State Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing the action on the following grounds: 
1. The acts complained of were discretionary 
functions for which the State Defendants have statutory 
immunity; and 
2. The State Defendants have quasi-judicial 
immunity for decisions made by and pursuant to their 
paroling authority. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State Defendants (Respondents) request this 
Court to affirm the Order of the District Court, dismissing 
this action, with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts does not accurately 
represent the circumstances surrounding the decision to 
release Mr. Arguelles, which is the only issue raised by 
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this action and by this appeal. Therefore, the State 
Defendants submit the following statement of facts. 
References are made to the Record on Appeal and to the 
original exhibit or document as presented to the District 
Court. 
1. Robert Arguelles was born February 14, 1962 
(birthdate on all Juvenile Court Records). 
2. In 1977, Arguelles came before the Second 
District Juvenile Court on two charges of car theft and one 
charge of gas theft. He was placed on probation (R. 175; 
Juvenile Court Record Sheet, Exhibit 1). 
3. On October 13, 1978, a petition was filed in 
Second District Juvenile Court, charging Arguelles with 
taking indecent liberties with a ten-year-old girl. The 
incident allegedly took place on October 5, 1978 (R. 177, 
Exhibit 2). This was the charge of which Arguelles was 
eventually found guilty and which was the basis for 
his ultimate commitment to the Youth Development Center (R. 
394, Garff Deposition, p. 8, 1. 18-25). 
4. On October 6, 1978, Arguelles was placed in 
the Salt Lake County Detention Center on the indecent 
Jiberties charge, but was released on house arrest on 
·: 1c Lober 25, 1978 (R. 394, Garff Deposition, p. 6, 1. 2-16) • 
5. On November 27, 1978, a petition was filed in 
District Juvenile Court charging Arguelles with 
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sodomy, the incident allegedly occurring September 15, 1978 
(R. 179, Petition, Exhibit 3). A trial was held on that 
petition on January 15, 1979. The charges were dismissed 
for insufficient evidence (R. 181, Minutes of Trial, Exhibit 
4; R. 183, Findings of Fact and Decree, Exhibit 5). Such 
dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal in the adult court 
system (R. 394, Garff Deposition, p. 10, 1. 7-13). 
6. From October 25, 1978, to February 23, 1979, 
Roberto Arguelles was at home, not held in custody by the 
court. However, on February 23, 1979, Arguelles was placed 
in detention pursuant to a pick-up order (arrest warrant) 
based on allegations that he was involved in a rape 
occurring February 21, 1979 (R. 185, 187, Affidavit for 
Taking Child Into Custody, Exhibit 6; Order for Detention, 
Exhibit 7). Arguelles continued in custody at various 
institutions from February 23, 1979, until December 19, 1979 
(R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 34; R. 189, Summary of 
Placements from Stromberg Deposition, Exhibit 8). 
7. A petition charging Roberto Arguelles with the 
rape of a 16-year-old girl was filed in the Second District 
Juvenile Court on February 28, 1979 (R. 191, Petition, 
Exhibit 9). This charge was dismissed in the interests of 
justice on August 24, 1979 (R. 175, Record Sheet, Exhibit l; 
R. 193, Motion and Order of Dismissal, Exhibit 10). 
8. Trial was held on the indecent liberties 
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charge (R. 177, Petition, Exhibit 2), on March 2, 1979. 
Arguelles was found guilty as alleged in the amended 
petition, to-wit: taking indecent liberties with a ten-
year-old girl by having her fondle his genitals (R. 195, 
Minutes of Trial, exhibit 11). This is the only sexual 
offense of which Roberto Arguelles was ever found guilty by 
the Juvenile Court (R. 175, Record Sheet, Exhibit l; R. 
394, Garff Deposition, p. 15, 1. 18-23). 
9. Following conviction on the indecent liberties 
charge, Roberto Arguelles was placed in the custody of the 
Utah State Hospital, Youth Center, for observation and 
evaluation (R. 197, Order for Short-Term Confinement, 
Exhibit 12). 
10. The Youth Center at the State Hospital 
returned Roberto Arguelles to the Juvenile Court on March 
28, 1979, saying he was inappropriate for their program 
(R.199-200, see letter dated March 27, 1979, Exhibit 13; R. 
394, Garff Deposition, p. 21, 1. 5-8). 
11. Roberto Arguelles stayed in detention until 
April 4, 1979, when he was sent to the Youth Development 
Center for short-term observation and evaluation (R. 202, 
Order for Short-Term Confinement, Exhibit 14). 
12. While on short-term commitment to the Youth 
Development Center, Roberto Arguelles was evaluated three 
times by Dr. Benjamin Taylor, a psychiatrist. His reports 
-5-
are attached as Exhibits to his Affidavit, which is Exhibit 
15 to the Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (R. 204-219). Roberto 
Arguelles was sent back to the court following the 
observation period with the reports from Dr. Taylor and a 
report from Donald Tatton, the Coordinator of the 
Observation Unit at the Youth Development Center (R. 220-
224, Tatton Report, Exhibit 16). 
13. After the observation period at the Youth 
Development Center, the juvenile court's probation officer, 
Mark Smith, recommended that Arguelles be placed on a stayed 
commitment to the Youth Development Center and returned home 
to receive out-patient treatment at Granite Community Mental 
Health Center (R. 226, Smith Report, Exhibit 17; Smith 
Deposition, p. 62-66 [Smith Deposition not in appellate 
record although cited many times by appellant]). 
14. On June 26, 1979, following his return from 
observation at the Youth Development Center, Roberto 
Arguelles was sent by the Juvenile Court (Judge Garff) to 
the Sexual Offenders Program at the Utah State Hospital (R. 
228, Order for Short-Term Confinement, Exhibit 18). 
15. On July 20, 1979, Judge Garff received a 
report from the State Hospital saying that Roberto Arguelles 
would not be kept in the Sexual Offenders Program (R. 230-
231, letter dated July 19, 1979, Exhibit 19). Roberto 
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Arguelles was returned to the Salt Lake County Detention 
Center on July 31, 1979 (R. 233, Detention Order, Exhibit 
20). 
16. After Arguelles was returned the second time 
from the State Hospital, Judge Garff was left without any 
alternatives except to commit him to the Youth Developement 
Center. The judge did not want to send him to the Youth 
DEvelopement Center, knowing that the therapeutic program he 
wanted for Arguelles did not exist at the Youth Development 
Center (R. 394, Garff Deposition, page 29, 1. 17-25; p. 30, 
1. 1-12). 
17. On August 7, 1979, Mark Smith, the juvenile 
court probation officer, recommended that Arguelles be 
committed to the Youth Development Center (R. 235-236, Smith 
Report, Exhibit 21). 
18. Roberto Arguelles was committed to the Youth 
Development Center on August 7, 1979. The order specified 
that the commitment was nunc pro tune to April 5, 1979 (R. 
238, Findings of Fact and Decree, Exhibit 22). Judge Garff 
wrote an accompanying letter to the Superintendent at the 
Youth Development Center expressing his concerns about 
Roberto Arguelles (R. 240-241, letter dated August 7, 1979, 
Exhibit 23). Again, the letter specified that the 
co!'lmilment was nunc pro tune to give the Superintendent 
"some flexibility as to his release date" and "make it 
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possible for him to be released prior to a six-month period 
from this date.• 
19. Careful consideration was given to all the 
terms of Judge Garff's letter by the officials at the Youth 
Development Center (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 75-76). 
20. In August, 1979, when Roberto Arguelles was 
committed to the Youth Development Center, the 
Superintendent was Ralph Garn. However, Dr. Garn left the 
Youth Development Center on December 1, 1979, prior to the 
release of Roberto Arguelles (R. 392, Garn Deposition, p. 8, 
1. 9; p. 17, 1. 4-24). 
21. Ronald Stromberg was the Assistant 
Superintendent at the Youth Development Center in August, 
1979, and became Acting Superintendent on December 1, 1979 
(R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 18, 1. 1-3). 
22. Russell Van Vleet was employed at the Youth 
Development Center in September, 1979, as Treatment and 
Release Coordinator (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 4, 1. 
25; p. 5, 1. 2). 
23. Roberto Arguelles was assigned to Gates 
Cottage. The Cottage Coordinator of Gates Cottage at the 
time Arguelles was committed was Dave Fowers (R. 243-248, 
Fower Affidavit, Exhibit 24). 
24. Roberto Arguelles exhibited outstanding 
behavior in school, at his cottage, in his interactions with 
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ulher students and staff, and in his working situation. He 
showed control in stress situations at the Youth Develoment 
Center. He worked in close contact with female staff 
members and had no behavior problems with them. He had no 
negative incident reports during his commitment period, 
which is unusual when compared to other students at the 
Youth Development Center (R. 243-248, Fowers Affidavit, 
Exhibit 24; R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 37, 1. 24-25; 
p. 38, 1. 1-6; p. 39, 1. 1-4, 7-15; p. 62, 1. 16-25; p. 63, 
1. 1-22). 
25. Roberto Arguelles was evaluated again by Dr. 
Benjamin Taylor on August 28, 1979. His report of that 
meeting is attached as Exhibit 4 to his affidavit, which is 
Exhibit 15 here (R. 218-219). 
26. An initial review hearing is held on every 
student at the Youth Development Center. The purpose of the 
initial review is to develop a release plan (R. 393, Van 
Vleet Deposition, p. 9, 1. 1-5; R. 250-260, Policy 
Documents, Exhibit 25). 
27. An initial review hearing was held on Roberto 
Arguelles on September 19, 1979 (R. 262, Exhibit 26). 
28. Prior to the initial review, Russ van Vleet 
personally talked to Roberto Arguelles (R. 393, van Vleet 
Deposition, p. 21, 1. 14-25; p. 22, 1. 1-2). Russ Van Vleet 
also read and considered Judge Garff's letter and Dr. 
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Taylor's reports (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 22, 1. 3-
6). Based upon their expressed concerns and his own, Russ 
Van Vleet recommended that Roberto Arguelles begin 
counseling treatment with Janet Warburton, a female clinical 
social worker and psychologist trainee, while he was at the 
Youth Development Center (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 
20, 1. 19-24). Roberto Arguelles was one of very few 
students who had individual counseling or treatment from a 
psychologist while at the Youth Development Center (R. 393, 
Van Vleet Deposition, p. 23, 1. 14-22). 
29. Janet Warburton saw Roberto Arguelles 
approximately four times during his stay at the Youth 
Development Center (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 7, 1. 
7). A summary report from Janet Warburton is attached as 
Exhibit 27 (R. 264). 
30. Janet Warburton felt that Roberto Arguelles 
needed long-term therapy to resolve his aggressive/sexual 
feelings. However, she never anticipated that such therapy 
would take place while Arguelles was at the Youth 
Development Center (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 13, 1. 
24-25). Similarly, Dr. Benjamin Taylor felt Roberto 
Arguelles needed a long-term therapeutic program, but he 
never felt that such program could have been accomplished at 
the Youth Develoment Center (R. 205-206, Taylor Affidavit, 
Exhibit 15, para. 3). 
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31. Both Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton 
recommended that an out-patient counseling program for 
Arguelles should be established prior to his release from 
the Youth Development Center (R. 264, Warburton Report, 
Exhibit 27; R. 206, Taylor Affidavit, Exhibit 15, para. 4). 
It was the parole officer's responsibility to set up out-
patient treatment while Arguelles was at the Youth 
Development Center (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 42, p. 
43, l. 18-24). Arguelles saw a counselor at Family Health 
Plan twice prior to his release while he was on home visits 
from the Youth Development Center (R. 266, Letter from A. 
Gilmore, dated November 30, 1979, Exhibit 28). The Youth 
Development Center was informed by a Family Health Plan 
professional that the program was willing to continue seeing 
Arguelles as an outpatient (R. 268, letter from Reid 
Holbrook, Exhibit 29). The treatment and release team was 
assured-by the parole officer that outpatient treatment for 
Arguelles had been established and would continue (R. 393, 
Van Vleet Deposition, p. 43, 1. 58Z). 
32. A pre-release hearing is held on every student 
at the Youth Development Center when the cottage staff feel 
the youth has accomplished all he can or should at the Youth 
Center and would like him to be reviewed for 
release (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 25, 1. 26). The 
pre-release hearing for Roberto Arguelles was held Decmeber 
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15, 1979 (R. 270, Pre-Release Report, exhibit 30). The 
decision at the Pre-Release hearing was that Roberto 
Arguelles should be released when certain goals had been 
accomplished (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 30, 1. 6-10), 
33. The conditions for release set by the review 
team at the pre-release hearing were: 
1. Meet weekly with Annette Gilmore, counselor. 
2. Attend Kearns Community School Monday through 
Thursday, 6:00 to 10:00. 
3. work regularly at Owens Insulation. 
4. Live at home with his mother. 
5. Meet weekly with his parole officer. 
(R. 270, Exhibit 30). 
34. The parole officer, Craig Berthold, attended 
the pre-release hearing. He reported that Roberto Arguelles 
had registered for night school, had a job, and was seeing a 
counselor (R. 270, see Exhibit 30). 
35. When all conditions recommended at the pre-
release hearing are met, an exit interview is scheduled with 
the Superintendent (R. 391, Stromberg depsition, p. 30, 1. 
24-25; p. 31, 1. 1-3). The exit interview for Roberto 
Arguelles was held on December 19, 1979, with Acting 
Superintendent Ronald Stromberg (R. 391, Stromberg 
Deposition, p. 31). Arguelles' placement agreement was 
signed at the exit interview (R. 272, Exhibit 31). 
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36. The parole agreement conditions and 
were discussed in detail with Roberto 
Arguelles. Mr. Stromberg informed Roberto that his parole 
could be revoked if the agreement was not kept (R. 391, 
Stromberg Deposition, p. 31, 1. 19-23). The conditions of 
the parole agreement were: 
1. Robert will reside with his mother. 
2. Robert will attend Kearns Community School 
Monday through Thursday, 6 to 10. 
3. Robert must obey all civil laws. 
4. Robert will maintain weekly contact with his 
placement officer, Craig Berthold, for the first 30 days of 
his placement and theref ter on a schedule set up by Robert 
and his placement officer. 
5. Robert will meet weekly with a professional 
counselor. 
6. Robert will work regularly at Owen's 
Insulation. 
(R. 272, Exhibit 31). 
37. When Mr. Stromberg was informed at the exit 
interview that the counselor Arguelles had been seeing at 
Family Health Plan was a graduate student, he amended the 
agreement and required that the parole officer either make 
sure that a professional counselor see Arguelles himself or 
supervise Annette Gilmore, the graduate student (R. 391, 
-13-
Plaement Agremeent, Exhibit 31; R. 272, Stromberg 
Deposition, p. 77, 1. 8-18). 
38. Mr. Stromberg did not request a final 
evaluation of Roberto Arguelles by Dr. Benjamin Taylor prior 
to releasing Arguelles (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 59, 
1. 18-25). It was not within Dr. Taylor's responsibilities 
to review or approve release decisions regarding any youth 
at the Youth Development Center (R. 205, Taylor Affidavit, 
Exhibit 15, para. 2). It was not standard procedure to 
consult Dr. Taylor regarding release of a student (R. 393, 
van Vleet Deposition, p. 54, 1. 10-12). However, Mr. 
Stromberg did have several conversations with Dr. Taylor 
regarding Arguelles and plans for his release (R. 391, 
Stromberg Deposition, p. 56, 1.,4-8; p. 59, 1. 18-20) and 
Dr. Taylor never disagreed with the release plans (R. 391, 
Stromberg Depsition, p. 38, 1. 18-22; p. 79, 1. 17-19; R. 
393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 55, 1. 4-9). 
39. Janet Warburton was considered the 
"professional of record" as far as Arguelles' treatment (R. 
391, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 54, 1. 10-12). Both Mr. Van 
Vleet and Mr. Stromberg discussed the plans for Arguelles' 
release with Ms. Warburton (R, 393, Van Vleet Deposition, P· 
29, 1. 14-i7; R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 56, 1. 4-B; 
p. 59, 1. 18-20). Ms. Warburton was aware of the release 
plan (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 14, 1. 5; p. 15, 1. 
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J·SJ, and thought the release was appropriate based on her 
knowledge and information at the time (R. 390, Warburton 
Deposition, p. 16, 1. 2-3). Ms. Warburton never recommended 
that Arguelles not be released, even given her report that 
Arguelles may be dangerous if not treated (R. 390, Warburton 
Deposition, p. 14, 1. 3; p. 15, 1. 9 1 14-17; p. 16, 1. 7-8). 
Ms. Warburton agreed that Arguelles should be released as 
long as he was in treatment prior to the release (R. 393, 
van Vleet Deposition, p. 29, 1. 19-25; p. 47, 1. 15-25; p. 
48, 1. 1). Janet Warburton's agreement to the release was 
very important to Mr. Van Vleet's recommendation that 
Arguelles should be released (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, 
p. 30, 1. 1-7). 
40. Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton agree that 
neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist can predict future 
behavior or dangerousness (R. 207, Taylor Affidavit, Exhibit 
15, pra. 6; R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 17, 1. 3-6). 
41. Ms. Warburton thought Robert Arguelles needed 
psychotherapy to lessen his dangerousness (R. 390, Warburton 
Deposition, p. 17, 1. 15-21) but acknowledged that such 
treatment could not guarantee that Arguelles would not harm 
Bomeone in the future (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 
18, 1. 12-16). 
42. All youths at the Youth Development Center are 
dangerous either to persons or property (R. 390, Warburton 
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Deposition, p. 24, 1. 2-5). In 1979, over 46 percent of the 
youths at the Youth Development Center had at least one 
life-endangering felony on their record. The average 
student at the Youth Development Center in 1979 had 6.29 
felony convictions and 18.528 total convictions, including 
felonies, misdemeanors, and ordinances. In comparison, 
Roberto Arguelles had three felony convictions (two of which 
were much earlier car thefts) and four total convictions. 
On the offense severity matrix, a system devised by the 
Juvenile Courts and the Division of Youth Corrections to 
measure severity of a juvenile offender's offense record, 
Roberto Arguelles had 113 severity matrix points. The 
average student in 1979 had 170.5 severity matrix points, 
and 64.4 percent had more severity points than Roberto 
Arguelles (R. 274-276, Burnett Affidavit, Exhibit 32). 
43. Roberto Arguelles' juvenile court record of 
convicted offenses, consisted of two car thefts, one gas 
theft, and one sexual abuse charge (taking indecent 
liberties) and was extremely light when compared with the 
records of other youths committed to the Youth Development 
Center (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 64, 1. 19-25; p. 
65, 1. 1, 20-25; p. 66, 1. 1-2). 
44. Arguelles' committed time was approximately 
nine months, longer than the average length of stay at the 
Youth Development Center, and much longer than others with 
-16-
similar records (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 66, 1. 4-
19) • 
45. Arguelles was released from the Youth 
Development Center on December 19, 1979 (R. 272, Placement 
Agreement, Exhibit 31). 
46. The sole authority for release or parole at 
the Youth Development Center is the Superintendent (R. 391, 
Stromberg Deposition, p. 12, 1. 18-20). Arguelles was 
released by authority of Ronald Stromberg as Acting 
Superintendent (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 18, 1. 16-
20). Russ Van Vleet had no authority to release or not 
release Arguelles. Russ van Vleet did not sign the release 
form (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 24, 1. 7-9). 
47. The Superintendent does not have supervisory 
authority over parole officers. It is not the 
Superintendent's responsibility to see that parole officers 
properly execute a parole agreement (R. 391, Stromberg 
Deposition, p. 72, l. 4-7; p. 73, 1. 3-7). The 
Superintendent has the authority to revoke parole, but has 
no way of ascertaining parole violations unless notified by 
the parole officer. The parole officer must submit 
yuarterly reports to the Superintendent. The only quarterly 
parole report on Roberto Arguelles was submitted after 
Arguelles was in jail, having been arrested for the assault 
on Plaintiff's ward (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 71, 1. 
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11-16; R. 278, Quarterly Report, Exhibit 33 ) . 
48. Roberto Arguelles' assault on Plaintiff's 
ward, out of which this lawsuit arose, occurred on or about 
March 6, 1980 (R. 3, Complaint, para. 4). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The only issue on appeal is whether the State 
Defendants (particularly Ronald Stromberg) may be held 
liable for the decision to release Roberto Arguelles on 
parole from the State Youth Development Center. Contrary 
to the implications in Appellant's Brief, there are D.Q.t. 
issues raised concerning the amount of superivsion by the 
parole officer following the release, the parole officer's 
role in implementing the parole plan, or the failure to 
retake Arguelles into custody. None of these questions 
were raised in the complaint and should not be allowed to 
cloud the only issue properly before the Court: Are the 
State Defendants immune from liability arising out of the 
decision to release Roberto Arguelles from the Youth 
Development Center? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION TO RELEASE ARGUELLES FROM 
THE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER WAS A 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION FOR WHICH 
IMMUNITY IS RETAINED PURSUANT TO THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Judge Fishler, in the court below, dismissed this 
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action against the State Defendants based, in part, upon the 
uiscretionary function doctrine of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity act. 
The State of Utah has, with certain exceptions, 
retained its sovereign immunity from suit "for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function.• 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-3. Appellant does not dispute that 
the operation of a state youth corrections system is a 
governmental function. (For legal arguments on this issue, 
see State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, pp. 19-21, R. 126-128). 
Because the operation of the Youth Development 
Center was a governmental function, any suit must be based 
on a specific waiver of immunity that is found in the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-5 through 
63-30-10. Though it was never so alleged in the complaint, 
this action was apparently brought under Section 63-30-10, 
which generally waives immunity for injuries caused by the 
negligence of state employees. However, this section has 
eleven specific exceptions to the waiver of immunity. 
Immunity is retained for any injury that •arises out of the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused." Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-10(1) (a). 
Judge Fishler held that the decision to release 
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Arguelles from the Youth Development Center was a 
discretionary function for which immunity is retained. 
Notwithstanding the heavy weight of authority supporting 
Judge Fishler's decision, Appellant contends that the 
decision to release an inmate on parole from the Youth 
Development Center is not a discretionary function for 
purposes of governmental immunity. 
Respondents are not aware of even one case in 
which a decision to release an inmate on parole has been 
held not to be a discretionary function for purposes of 
statutory governmental immunity. There are cases which have 
found the actions of a parole or probation officer .£f..t..ei 
the decision to release has been made to be ministerial 
rather than discretionary but even in those cases, the 
actual decision to release has still been granted immunity, 
Utah law supports the finding that in the present 
case, the decision to release Arguelles must be granted 
immunity. This Court, in a decision issued one week ago, 
discussed the discretionary function analysis, as well as 
its applicability to parole decisions. 
In Little y. Utah State Division of Family 
Services, No. 18113 (July 1, 1983) the Court stated, as it 
has on other occasions, that it would follow the lead of the 
federal courts in applying the discretionary function 
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act: 
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Utah's exceptions to waiver of 
governmental immunity closely parallel 
those enumerated under 28 u.s.c., s 
2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
This Court has followed the lead of • 
cases interpreting that act. Frank v. 
State, Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (1980). 
Beginning with the two root cases of 
Dalehite v. United States, 3466 U.S. 15, 
73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) and 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 
U.S. 61, 76 s.ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 
(1955), the lines in federal cases have 
been consistently drawn between those 
functions ascribable to the policy 
making level and those to the 
operational level. State law has 
followed along analogous lines. 
The Court then cited Payton y. United States, 
679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying the same planning/operational 
level test as has been adopted by this Court, found the 
decision to release a prisoner on parole to be a 
discretionary function for which there must be absolute 
immunity. 
The Payton case is basically dispositive of the 
present case. The circumstances out of which arose 
were certainly as tragic and disturbing as those in this 
case. In 1975 and 1976, a parolee from federal custody 
brutally murdered three women, including the appellant's 
• 1 re, Sheryl Payton. The murders included rape and "hideous 
mutilation" of the women's bodies. The murderer's severe 
1Pental illness and homicidal aggressive tendencies toward 
women were well documented in records available to the 
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paroling authority. The appellants alleged that the Board 
of Parole was liable for deciding to release a "known 
homicidal psychotic." 679 F.2d at 477-478. Despite the 
obvious tragedy involved, the Fifth Circuit recognized the 
absolute need for immunity for the discretionary function of 
making almost impossibly difficult parole decisions. 
Therefore, overuling a three-judge panel of its own court, 
the Court held that the discretionary function exception of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act did apply, and the case was 
dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. 679 F.2d 
at 483. 
The similarities between Payton and the present 
case are obvious. As in this case, the plaintiff alleged 
that the Parole Board nhad access to records showing that 
Whisenhant [the prisoner] was a psychotic with homicidal 
tendencies land would endanger society if released," and 
further that "the Board negligently failed to acquire, read, 
or give adequate consideration to those records." The Court 
held: 
To withstand a motion to dismiss, an 
allegation challenging the Board's 
performance of any ministerial act must 
be sufficiently distinguishable from a 
complaint disputing the Board's exercise 
of its discretionary function. The 
plaintiff must therefore allege that the 
Board breached a duty sufficiently 
separable from the decision-making 
function to be nondiscretionary and 
outside of the exception. The plaintiff 
may not withstand a motion to dismiss by 
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alleging that the Board's decision was 
wrong. 
Explaining its holding, the Fifth 
Circuit said: 
In fulfilling this task, the Board must 
exercise its judgment by determining the 
materiality of certain studies and 
documents and the propriety of relying 
thereon in reaching its final 
assessment. Further, the manner and 
degree of consideration with which the 
Board examines these materials is 
inextricably tied to its ultimate 
decision. This allegation thus 
addresses the Board's exercise of its 
discretionary function. 
679 F.2d at 482. 
In Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), 
this Court held that the discretionary function exception 
applied to give immunity to the State when the children of a 
murder victim sued the State of Utah alleging that it was 
negligent in allowing the murderer, a state prison inmate 
involved in a work-release program, to escape and kill their 
mother. This Court upheld the dismissal of the action 
holding that the decision to place an inmate into the 
community on work-release was within the "discretionary 
function• doctrine. The Court held that the creation of a 
work release program was a discretionary decision. 
the Court said: 
In addition to the exercise of this 
judgment as to the value and 
practicability of such a program 
generally, there are problems about its 
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advisability as to each individual 
prisoner. In order to weigh the 
positive values of possible benefit for 
him in such a program against the 
negative factors such as the likelihood 
of his escaping and engaging in more 
antisocial conduct, it is essential to 
consider the various aspects of his 
personality: his intelligence, 
aptitudes and qualities of character 
such as honesty, integrity and industry; 
and whether he has demonstrated a 
sincere desire to rehabilitate himself 
so that there is a reasonable 
probability that he will succeed. 
Accordingly, we agree with the view of 
the trial court that the handling of the 
prisoner Michael Hart was something 
which "arises out of the exercise of a 
discretionary function" for which 
subsection (1) of Section 63-30-10, 
quoted above, has retained sovereign 
immunity. 
546 P.2d at 244. 
The same analysis applies to the present case. 
The decision to release Roberto Arguelles from the Youth 
Development Center inherently involved consideration and 
weighing of all factors cited in Epting and many others; 
i.e., the possibility of future violence, the negative 
effect of further incarceration on the juvenile's attitude, 
the permanence of the behavior modification achieved at the 
Youth Development Center, etc. An enormous amount of data, 
theories and projections had to be integrated and evaluated 
before a decision could be reached. This Court has said 
that an inmate's "rehabilitation is the responsibility of 
professional men, and the manner in which it is accomplished 
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rr"1f;t lJe a matter of discretion.• Beal y. Turner, 454 P.2d 
b24, 626 (Utah 1969). Utah law clearly supports a finding 
that the decision to release Roberto Arguelles was a 
discretionary function for which the State Detendants are 
immune from suit. Utah is not alone in holding a release 
decision to be within the discretionary function exception. 
In Cairl y. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Min. 1982), a 
state facility released a mentally retarded juvenile with 
dangerous propensities on a holiday home leave. While at 
home, the youth started a fire, as he had done on several 
prior occasions, which destroyed an apartment building and 
caused a death. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, which 
decided the case in August, 1982, first explained the 
reasons for the discretionary function exemption, which was 
almost identical to Utah's. 
l.ll at 23. 
This exemption from tort liability 
recognizes that the courts, through the 
vehicle of a negligence action, are not 
an appropriate forum to review and 
second-guess the acts of government 
which involve "the exercise of judgment 
or discretion." (Citations omitted.) 
As stated in Weiss y. Trote, 7 N.Y.2d 
579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y./S.2d 409 
(1960): To accept a jury's verdict as 
to the reasonableness and safety of a 
plan of governmental services and prefer 
it over the judgment of the governmental 
body which originally considered and 
passed on the matter would be to 
obstruct normal governmental operations 
and to place in inexpert hands what the 
Legislature has seen fit to entrust to 
experts. 
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The Minnesota court then followed the planning 
level-operational level distinction which is currently 
accepted by this Court (Carroll v. State Road commission, 
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972)), to determine whether the release 
decision fit within the discretionary function exception. 
.Id· at 23 n. 1. The Court then held: 
The decision to release Tom Connolly, 
involving as it does the professional 
evaluation of such factors as the 
protection of the public, his physical 
and psychological needs, the relative 
suitability of the home environment, and 
the need to reintegrate him into the 
community, is precisely the type of 
goyernmental decision that discretionary 
immunity was designed to protect from 
tort litigation by after-the-fact 
review • 
.Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
In Johnson y. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Ca. 1968), 
the Supreme Court of California held that the discretionary 
function exception of California Gov. Code S 820.2 applied 
to a juvenile release decision. The Court found: 
The Youth Authority unquestionably makes 
some decisions falling within the 
•discretionary function" language of 
section 820.2, as we have heretofore 
defined it [planning versus operational 
levels]. As to the determination of 
whether to place a youth on parole, for 
example, the Legislature has 
specifically granted to the Youth 
Authority the power to weigh potential 
risks and benefits and to establisn 
standards: •when, in the opinion of the 
Youth Authority, any person committed to 
or confined in any such school deserves 
parole according to regulations 
established for the purpose, and it 
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will be to his advantage to be paroled 
the Authority may grant parole under ' 
such conditions as it deems best ••• 
(Welf. & Inst. Code S 1176). The 
decision to parole thus comprises the 
resolution of policy considerations, 
entrusted by statute to a coordinate 
branch of government, that compels 
immunity from judicial reexamination. 
lJ2. at 361. 
The authority of the Superintendent of the Youth 
Development Center to parole inmates is very similar to 
those of the California Youth Authority. Utah Code Ann. s 
64-6-8, 12. Arguelles was released pursuant to the 
statutory powers of the Superintendent after careful 
consideration of all factors involved. The State Defendants 
are therefore immune from this suit by operation of the 
retention of absolute immunity for the exercise of a 
discretionary governmental function. Utah Code Ann. S 63-
30-10(1) (a). Appellant cites no cases in which it is held 
that a parole decision is not a discretionary function for 
purposes of immunity. The overwhelming authority is that 
the decision to release a prisoner on parole is a 
discretionary function to which immunity must apply. The 
Respondents request this Court to affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of this action. 
[Also, see Thompson y. County of Alameda, 614 
P.2d 7?8 (Cal. 1980); Berry y. State, 400 So.2d 80 (Fla. 
App. 1981); Papenhausen y. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 
1978); Seiss y. McConnell, 255 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. App. 1977); 
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Adamoy y. State, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1975); and 
smart y. United States, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953), all 
of which are cases in which discretionary function immunity 
was applied to release or parole decisions.) 
POINT II 
THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE ON THE 
BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL 
IMMUNITY. 
The District Court also based its dismissal of 
this case on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. As can 
be seen from the preceding point, and an extensive survey of 
the cases in this area, the courts around the country are 
very protective of paroling authorities and their decision-
making processes. Because this function is so similar to 
that performed regularly by judges in criminal courts, most 
judges recognize the need for immunity, and the serious 
threat to parole decision making which would arise absent 
immunity. 
The superintendent of the Youth Development Center 
was the juvenile corrections system's equivalent to the 
State Board of Pardons in the adult system. The 
superintendent had the authority to place (parole) a student 
outside the school. Utah Code Ann. § 64-6-8 (repealed 
1981). The superintendent also had the power to discharge 
(pardon) a student, thereby terminating the state's control 
over that individual. Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-6-12, 64-4-13 
(repealed 1981). This action was an attempt to hold the 
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c:ilpet intendent and the State of Utah liable for a parole 
decision made by this official. 
At common law, it has been a long established 
principle that a judge is immune from suit. Judicial 
immunity is applied to every judicial officer. Its broad 
scope and coverage is unaffected by allegations of 
negligence, recklessness or malice. 
Judicial immunity has been extended, at common 
law, to numerous non-judicial Officers. When so extended it 
is known as quasi-judicial immunity. In McLallen v. 
Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1974) the court 
explained the scope of this immunity. 
Judicial immunity is only granted to 
non-judicial officials who, like judges, 
must not be unduly inhibited to exercise 
discretionary authority by the constant 
fear of personal liability for damages. 
Applied to non-judicial officials, 
judicial immunity is termed quasi-
judicial immunity and examples are 
prosecuting attorneys and parole board 
members. 
,lil. at 299-300 (emphasis added). 
In Pate y. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, 
409 F.Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976) the court elaborated the 
poljcy reasons that support the protections afforded by 
quasi-judicial immunity. was an attempt to recover 
damages from the parole board, and its members, that were 
allegedly suffered when plaintiff's decedent was attacked by 
a parolee. 
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Parole officials bear a more than 
ordinary responsibility because of the 
dangerous traits already demonstrated by 
those with whom they must deal. This 
responsibility imposes far greater moral 
burdens and requires far more difficult 
legal choices than those met by the 
average administrative officer. The 
function of the Parole Board is more 
nearly akin to that of a judge in 
imposing sentence and granting or 
denying probation than it is to that of 
an executive administrator. It is 
essential to the proper administration 
of criminal justice that those who 
determine whether an individual shall 
remain incarcerated or be set free 
should do so without concern over 
possible personal liability at law for 
such criminal acts as some parolee will 
inevitably commit, in other words, that 
such officials should be able to 
exercise independent judgment without 
pressure of personal liability for acts 
of the subject of their deliberations • 
.IQ. at 479. 
In a footnote, the court continued: 
The system of rehabilitation practices 
in this country, involving probation, 
parole, and pardon, could not be 
effective if those burdened with the 
decisions incident thereto were 
subjected to personal liability for 
mistakes, the occurrence of which is 
inherent to the system • 
.l.d. at 479. 
The decision to place Roberto back in 
the community was a parole decision. As such, those 
officials charged with making that decision are covered by 
quasi-judicial immunity. In Dock y. State of Utah, 
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c-79-720 (D. Utah, december 1, 1980), the Federal District 
c11•lft of Utah dismissed an action against the State of 
Utah's Board of Pardons saying: •The Board of Pardons, in 
exercising the responsibilities they did, were clothed with 
quasi-judicial immunity and were not responsible for any 
error in the method in which the calendaring of his case was 
handled, lamentable as that may be at this point.• Even 
assuming an error in judgment was made, the defendants in 
this case would still be immune from this suit. The very 
purpose of quasi-judicial immunity is to avoid inhibiting 
the official's functioning in office from fear of lawsuits 
and personal liability sterning from his official actions. 
When speaking of judicial immunity, the United States 
Supreme Court said, in Pierson y. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 
(1967) : 
This immunity applies even when the 
judge is accused of acting maliciously 
and corruptly, and it •is not for the 
protection or benefit of a malicious or 
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of 
the public, whose interest it is that 
the judges should be at liberty to 
exercise their functions with 
independence and without fear of 
consequences.• 
N. at 554. 
Appellants cite Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons 
and Parole, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977) as authority for the 
proposition that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to 
paroling authorities (App. Brief, p. 22). 
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decision often combines discussions of discretionary 
function immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and the non-
immunity issue of public duty. Although it does appear that 
the G.I.i.lnm court abolished the doctrine of absolute quasi-
judicial immunity for parole authorities in Arizona, it did 
so over a strong dissent, citing an earlier Arizona case: 
The words of Justice Udall in Wilson y, 
67 Ariz. 197, 193 P.2d 461 
(1948), which the majority overrules, 
are as true now as they were then: 
•rwJe can also say that we are well 
aware of the fact that in thus shielding 
public officers, who act strictly within 
their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, against actions of this sort 
the rule may work hardship and injustice 
in individual cases. But there is no 
middle ground to be occupied in the 
matter; either all of such suits are to 
be tolerated or none. The court may 
occasionally be confronted with the not-
unusual situation that calls for 
subordination of the rights of the few 
to the interests of the whole body of 
the public. The doctrine of immunity is 
not for the benefit of the few who might 
otherwise be compelled to respond in 
damages. It is for the benefit of all 
to whom it applies, that they may be 
free to act in the exercise of honest 
judgment, uninfluenced by fear of 
consequences personal to themselves. 
This again is not for their personal 
advantage or benefit. It is only that 
they may be enabled to render a better 
public services.• 67 Ariz. at 202, 193 
P.2d at 464, 
.l.d.... at 1237. 
The G.I.i.lnm case has been called an •aberration in 
the law• by other Arizona courts, Cody y. Sate, 630 P.2d 
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554, 560 (Ariz. App. 1981). Although .GJ;.imm. is upheld by 
the Arizona Supreme Court in RYan y. State, 656 P.2d 597 
(Ariz. 1982), it is on the issue of public duty, not on the 
issue of quasi-judicial immunity. The author of the opinion 
in Judge Hays, was the dissenting judge in GI..imm, 
and he specifically states in .B.:i..an. that he does not 
retreat from his dissent in GI..imm, and that the .B.:i..an. 
case should not be seen as dispositive on the issue of 
quasi-judicial immunity. 656 P.2d at 599. 
The !il.imm case is the only case cited by 
Appelalnts which suggests that quasi-judicial immunity 
should not be applicable to paroling authorities. There are 
a substantial number of federal cases which disagree. See 
for example, United States y. 684 F.2d 494 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Thompson y. Burke, 556 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 
1977); Pope y. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975). It 
appears that quasi-judicial immunity is almost uniformly 
applied to the decision-making role of a parole board or 
other paroling authority. Respondents urge that GI..ilnmr 
though relied upon heavily by Appellants, does not and 
should not represent the law of Utah. 
The same policy reasons that have resulted in the 
creation of an absolute judicial immunity mitigate in favor 
of an absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Imbler Y· 
424 U.S. 409 (1976); Lang y, Wood, 92 F.2d 211 
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(D.C. Cir. 1937). In situations like the present case, 
though the facts relating to Plaintiff's injuries and 
suffering are very sad, it is important to recognize the 
judicial nature of a parole decision and the need for 
immunity for such decisions. The decision to release 
Arguelles was not an easy one, nor was it taken lightly by 
the Superintendent or his staff. But after weighing all 
factors, and exercising their best professional judgment, it 
was decided that Arguelles should be released from the 
institution. That decision has to be made at some point 
with regard to every juvenile at the Youth Development 
Center, all of whom have records which include serious 
felonies. Because of the very difficult nature of these 
decisions, and the inherent risks to the decision-makers, 
they must be protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Applying 
the principle to this case, summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of the State Defendants, and this Court is 
urged to affirm that judgment. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
IS NOT ABROGATED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the 
argument that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is 
abrogated by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Because 
this issue was not raised below and therefore not ruled upon 
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by the District Court, it should not be considered on 
appeal. Lamkin y. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979). 
See also Shayne y. Stanby & Sons. Inc., 605 P.2d 775, 776 
(Utah 1980); Villeneuve y. Schammer, 639 P.2d 214, 215 
(Utah 1981). Even if this issue is properly before the 
Court, Appellant's contention is in error. 
Nothing in the language of the Governmental 
Immunity Act suggests that it was ever intended to abrogate 
all common-law immunities. Rather, the Act retains all 
sovereign immunity except as specifically waived in the Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. In interpreting the Governmental 
Immunity Act, this Court has held on several occasions that 
the Act should •be strictly applied to preserve sovereign 
immunity; and to waive it only as clearly expressed 
therein.• Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d 
1286, 1288 (Utah 1973). See also Sheffield y. Turner, 445 
P.2d 361 (Utah 1978); Epting y. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1976). There is absolutely no waiver or abrogation of 
common-law judicial or quasi-judicial immunity in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Appellant contends that all immunities meant to be 
allowed for the State of Utah or its employees are contained 
within the .Governmental Immunity Act, although no authority 
is cited for such a proposition. At page 24 of her brief, 
Appellant does beneficiently allow that common-law judicial, 
-35-
legislative, and prosecutorial immunity still exists despite 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Appellant gives no basis for 
the distinction between these common law immunities and the 
quasi-judicial immunity traditionally granted to paroling 
authorities. It is particularly interesting that Appellant 
included prosecutorial immunity as one that remains, since 
prosecutorial immunity .iR_ quasi-judicial immunity, derived 
from exactly the same source as the immunity granted to 
parole boards. McLallen y. Henderson, supra. 
Appellant cites this Court's ruling in State Land 
Board y. State Department of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 707 
(Utah 1965) that it is appropriate to look to the intended 
purposes of a statute in statutory construction. However, 
that case does not support Appellant's position in the 
present case. In that case, the plaintiffs were seeking to 
have sand and gravel included in the phrase ncoal and other 
mineralsn in a statute reserving rights to such to the 
state. The case had nothing to do with an abrogation of 
common law. Furthermore, if this Court looks to the 
"intended purposen of the Governmental Immunity Act, it will 
find nothing to indicate an intent to abrogate common law 
quasi-judicial immunity. 
Also cited by Appellant's brief is Drennan y. 
Security Pacific National Bank, 621 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1981) 
in which plaintiffs were seeking to have the common-law 
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prohibition of the •Rule of 78 1 s• method of computing the 
unearned portion of a finance charge in the event of 
prepayment applied even though there were at least six or 
5even statutes specifically allowing the method. The court 
held that it could not on common-law grounds change the 
legislatively enacted statutes. This case does D..l2t. 
support the proposition that a statute which does not 
specifically change or abrogate the common law should be 
construed as doing so. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), 
this Court ruled that the Governmental Immunity Act was 
intended •to replace the common law of official immunity and 
its distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts 
or omissions with a new standard coordinated with the 
standard of governmental immunity established in the 
Governmental Immunity Act.• 658 P.2d at 633. This 
discussion relates to discretionary function immunity which 
is included in the Governmental Immunity Act, and states 
that statutory standards rather than common law standards 
soould be applied to this particular type of immunity. 
does not suggest that all common law immunities, 
such as judicial and quasi-judicial immunities, are replaced 
by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In Pierson y. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), 
the leading United States Supreme Court case on judicial 
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immunity, the plaintiffs asserted that common-law judicial 
immunity was abolished by the enactment Of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which generally allows civil rights suits against 
governments and governmental officials. The Court said: 
We do not believe that this settled 
principle of law was abolished by § 
1983, which makes liable "every person• 
who under color of law deprives another 
person of his civil rights. The 
legislative record gives no clear 
indication that Congress meant to 
abolish wholesale all common-law 
immunities. Accordingly, this Court 
held in Tenney y, Brandhoye, 31 U.S. 
367 (1951), that the immunity of 
legislators for acts within the 
legislative role was not abolished. The 
immunity of judges for acts within the 
judicial role is equally well 
established, and we presume that 
Congress would have specifically so 
provided had it wished to abolish the 
doctrine. 
In Jackson y. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 
1979) the plaintiff argued that the enactment of the State 
Tort Defense Fund abrogated the common-law doctrine of 
official immunity. The court responded as follows: 
Jackson strives to convince this court 
that Section 105.710, supra, as most 
recently amended and presently existing, 
retroactively abrogated the doctrine of 
official immunity with respect to the 
complained of acts arising out of 
Wilson's performance of his official 
duties on the fateful day in question. 
Jackson's argument fails to wash for the 
principal reason that the language 
employed in the statute is unambiguous, 
conveys a plain and definite meaning, 
and the legislative intent which 
prompted its enactment is clearly 
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When such is the case, 
this court should and will abstain from 
foraging among various peripheral rules 
of construction for the purpose of 
rewriting a statute under the guise of 
construing it. (Citation omitted.) The 
language employed by the legislature in 
Section 105.710, supra, does not so much 
as hint or suggest that the doctrine of 
official immunity was even being eroded, 
much less abrogated, retroactively or 
otherwise. 
581 S.W.2d at 44. 
There is absolutely no language in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act which could be construed as 
abrogating the common-law doctrines of judicial or quasi-
judicial immunity. Therefore, quasi-judicial immunity can, 
and should be, applied in this case. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
WERE APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED. 
In her complaint, Appellant made certain 
allegations of gross negligence against Defendant Ronald 
Stromberg, the then Acting Superintendent of the Youth 
Development Center who, with proper authority, made the 
decision to release Arguelles from the Center. Appellant 
now claims that the gross negligence charges were improperly 
by Judge Fishler. 
The claims of gross negligence must be analyzed on 
lwo levels; first, with regard to quasi-judicial immunity. 
Quasi-judicial immunity extends even to charges of 
-39-
gross negligence, recklessness, or maliciousness. Pierson 
y. Ray, supra. Claims of gross negligence cannot defeat 
quasi-judicial immunity. Appellant seems to suggest that 
because something very bad happened after Arguelles was 
released, the release decision must have been grossly 
negligent and not entitled to immunity. This is almost a 
strict liability standard based on a hindsight understanding 
of what happened after Arguelles or any other inmate, was 
released. This is totally contrary to the policies and 
reasons for quasi-judicial immunity for paroling 
authorities. A similar argument drew strong comment from 
the dissenting judge in supra: 
Beware, oh unsuspecting trial judge, 
that when your decision to place a felon 
on probation goes horribly awry, the 
majority of my brothers sitting in 
cloistered ivory tower call your action 
gross and subject you to the 
consequences thereof. I hasten to 
concede that the majority opinion does 
not say this but logic tells me that the 
discretionary acts of the parole board 
need no less protection than those of 
the sentencing judge. There may be 
boards or commissions, bastions of 
bureaucracy, which should not be 
accorded the protection of quasi-
judicial immunity, but the parole board 
is hardly one of these. 
564 P.2d at 1237. 
Appellant's claims of gross negligence do not 
defeat quasi-judicial immunity, and Judge Fishler properly 
dismissed these claims along with the rest of the complaint. 
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The second prong of the gross negligence analysis 
·oncerns the statutory discretionary function immunity. At 
the time this action was brought, the Governmental Immunity 
Act provided that the immunities retained therein would 
apply to state employees •unless the employee acted or 
failed to act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice." 
U!tah Code Ann. § 63-30-4. (The •gross negligence" language 
of this section was removed by the 1983 Legislature, 
indicating its intent that gross negligence claims should 
not defeat immunity for employees.) 
Even though discretionary function immunity may 
not apply to gross negligence, it does by its own terms 
apply to abuses of discretion. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1) (a). Simply by characterizing the acts of 
Defendant Stromberg as grossly negligent, appellant cannot 
escape dismissal or summary judgment. 
Appellant has painstakingly selected excerpts from 
paragraphs of certain reports to portray the worst picture 
possible of Mr. Arguelles. Appellant's statement of facts 
also includes, as if they were established facts, unproved 
and dismissed charges against Mr. Arguelles, even Arguelles' 
own musings to a psychiatrist which certainly cannot be 
considered established facts. 
However, when the circumstances surrounding 
Arguelles' release are considered fairly and in their 
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entirety (see Respondents' Statement of facts), even when 
considered in the light most favorable to Appellant, it is 
clear that the decision to release Arguelles was far from 
grossly negligent. The decision-making process was careful, 
deliberate, and taken very seriously. The decision was not 
easy, nor was it made lightly or with no trepidation. The 
fact that Arguelles, three months later committed a terrible 
crime does not make the decision to release him grossly 
negligent. Unfortunately, no one, including judges or 
parole boards, is endowed with the foresight to guarantee 
that parolees will never again commit a serious crime. 
The definition of gross negligence set forth by 
Appellant (Appellant's Brief, p. 33) requires that an act 
must be "intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in 
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life 
or property of another" to qualify as gross negligence. 
There is nothing even approaching that standard in the 
present case. 
Appellant has not, and did not in District Court, 
set forth sufficient established facts to support her claims 
of gross neligence and preserve the issue for trial. She is 
not entitled to a trial merely because she alleged gross 
negligence. Judge Fishler's dismissal of those claims was 
entirely appropriate and should be affirmed by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, respondent 
requests this Court to affirm the Order of the District 
court, dismissing this action, with prejudice. 
1983. 
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